Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach

Abstract

We use a Nash bargaining framework to examine scope for bargaining in invasive species problemswhere spread depends on the employment of costly controls.Municipalities bargain over a transfer payment that slows spread but requires an infested municipality to forgo nonmarket benefits from the host species. We find that when the uninfestedmunicipality has a relative bargaining power advantage, bargaining may attain the first-best solution. However, in many cases a short-term bargaining agreement is unlikely to succeed, which suggests a role for higher levels of government to facilitate long-term agreements even when the details are left to municipalities to negotiate.

Keywords

Bioeconomics, Biological invasions, Emerald ash borer, Negotiation, Optimal control, Pest spread

Citation

Cobourn, Kelly M.; Amacher, Gregory S.; Haight, Robert G. 2019. Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach. Environmental and Resource Economics. 72(4): 1041-1068. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-018-0238-8.